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Abstract—Physical layer security key generation exploits unpredictable features from wireless channels to achieve high security, which
requires high reciprocity in order to set up symmetric keys between two users. This paper investigates enhancing the channel
reciprocity using a loop-back scheme with multiple frequency bands in time-division duplex (TDD) communication systems, in order to
mitigate the effect of hardware fingerprint interference and synchronization offset. The scheme is evaluated to be robust to passive
eavesdropping and active Man-in-the-Middle attack through both theoretical analyses and practical measurements. A secret key
generation protocol is subsequently designed. The performance of the proposed secret key generation method is then evaluated
through both numerical simulation and experiments. Results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can effectively mitigate
non-reciprocity and outperforms the classical TDD scheme in both key disagreement rate and key generation rate.
Index Terms—channel reciprocity, channel state information, hardware fingerprint, physical layer security, secret key generation,
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F
1 INTRODUCTION
S ECURE communication with a shared secret key hasbecome a hot research topic in wireless communica-
tions [1], [2], [3]. Conventional key distribution schemes,
such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, rely on the com-
plex mathematical algorithms and protocols [4], and usually
require a public key infrastructure (PKI). These schemes
may not be applicable in future massive low-cost and decen-
tralized networks such as the Internet of Things (IoT). Ex-
ploiting physical layer (PHY) channel information for secret
key generation is a potential complementary technology; it
extracts secret keys from the randomness of wireless channel
that has independent variation and reciprocal properties [5],
[6].
In PHY-information-based key generation, a pair of legit-
imate transceivers measure channel state information (CSI),
which usually varies continually during the communica-
tion [2]. However, the difference between the measured CSI
in each side of the two transceivers consequently leads to
key disagreements [7], [8]. The causes of CSI non-reciprocity
can be categorized as follows.
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• Channel variations between measurements: In time
division duplex (TDD) systems, uplink (UL) and down-
link (DL) channels are measured at different time slots.
The relative movements between users will cause CSI
variations in half-duplex measurements [9], [10].
• Hardware fingerprint interference: Due to the manu-
facturing deviation of radio components, the features
of the hardware are inherently different at each device,
including non-linearity of power amplifier, transceiver
filter characteristic, receiver auto gain control (AGC)
response and antenna coupling mismatch [11], [12],
[13].
• System synchronization errors: The oscillators at trans-
mitter and receiver deviate in terms of frequency and
phase, which will result in synchronization errors, and
consequently yield CSI non-reciprocity.
• Non-reciprocity in frequency-division duplex (FDD)
systems: In FDD systems, since the UL and DL trans-
missions are carried out in different frequency bands,
their channel features will not be reciprocal, which cre-
ates challenges for applying key generation methods.
Due to these practical issues, CSI non-reciprocity will
play a significant part in secret key generation. In order to
effectively implement a key generation method in practical
scenarios, it is imperative to find solutions that enhance the
CSI reciprocity. This represents the main motivation of this
work.
1.1 Related Work
In his seminal paper [14], Wyner introduced the wire-tap
channel and wireless information theoretic secrecy. In [15]
and [16], the possibility of generating common randomness
at two distant terminals was presented. Inspired by this
work, secret capacity of wireless channels has been ex-
2plored [17], [18], [19] and more recently, secure transmission
with multiple-antenna technologies has been presented [20],
[21]. In addition, the secret capacity when the eavesdropper
is very close to the legitimate receiver, has been also stud-
ied [20].
Key generation can exploit different properties of wire-
less channel, including received signal strength (RSS), chan-
nel phase, and CSI [22], [23]. RSS has been widely applied
for key extraction in the practical implementation as it is
readily available [2], [9], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30].
RSS-based key generation is affected by the channel vari-
ations between the measurements in TDD systems, which
can be alleviated by fractional interpolation filtering [9],
[27]. The major drawback of the RSS-based systems is the
low key generation speed, which is due to the fact that RSS
is a single dimension parameter and each packet can only
produce one RSS value. In order to increase the speed, a
multi-band RSS scheme using IEEE 802.15.4 was proposed
to obtain the frequency-selective fading of the channel [3].
Channel phase has also been investigated for key gener-
ation. The work in [31] proposed to exploit the phase vari-
ations of the multi-path channel to achieve a much higher
speed than RSS-based systems. However, channel phase can
be very vulnerable to hardware fingerprint interference and
synchronization. Although stochastic synchronization algo-
rithms can be employed to compensate the synchronization
error, the residual synchronization errors in both frequency
and time domain affect the channel phase variations.
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)
can obtain channel responses in both time and frequency
domains, which can be employed to achieve a much higher
speed [32], [33]. However, the OFDM system is also subject
to synchronization errors, which will affect the accuracy
of channel estimation. Recent work in [33] and [34] ana-
lyzed the influence of the time synchronization error on
the OFDM-based secret key extraction from theoretical and
experimental aspects, respectively. Precoding techniques are
proposed to compensate the transceiver non-reciprocity
with a priori knowledge [35]. The compensation and cali-
bration techniques at transmitter side was widely studied
in wireless TDD communication systems [12], [13], [35].
A channel gain complement mechanism was designed to
assist the secret key extraction with the help of subcarrier
amplitude information in [36], which can achieve a speed of
90 bits per packet with 3-bit quantization. With the help of
a priori information, the channel gain complement process
can reduce the CSI non-reciprocity caused by hardware
fingerprint interference. However, this process requires so-
phisticated non-reciprocity learning, which will increase the
implementation complexity.
There are also research efforts to apply key generation
in FDD systems. A scheme named Joint Randomness Not
Shared by Others (JRNSO) was designed with a loop-
back mechanism [37], which acts to mitigate the hardware
fingerprint interference. Each transceiver uses a different
transmission band and exchanges the estimated CSI using
its own band. With the help of loop-back transmission,
both transceivers can obtain equivalent CSI. Furthermore,
an improved loop-back scheme was proposed in [38] to real-
ize loop-back transmission in high-speed mobility scenario.
With the help of sophisticated design of loop-back transmis-
sion with appropriate time slots, CSI non-reciprocity caused
from channel variations could be partly eliminated [38].
Although private keys have been introduced in JRNSO [37],
[38], their security breach has not been carefully investi-
gated.
As with all wireless communications approaches, key
generation is also vulnerable to passive eavesdropping [5],
[20], [25], [28], [39], [40] and active attacks [41], [42]. As
communication theory indicates, eavesdroppers experience
an uncorrelated channel from legitimate users located half
wavelength away, which may not always true in a practical
environment because of insufficient multi-path [40]. An
active Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack has been reported
in [41] that affects the RSS-based key bit extraction by spoof-
ing received packets between legitimate users. Moreover,
authors in [42] investigated an active pilot contamination
attack in OFDM-based secret key extraction, by injecting the
same pilot sequences to the uplink communications.
1.2 Overview
Channel reciprocity is essential for users to agree on the
same keys. This paper presents a detailed investigation
of using loop-back mechanism for TDD key extraction to
improve the channel reciprocity. In particular, we take into
account of the hardware fingerprint interference and phase
offset, and analyze their effects on the channel reciprocity.
The main contributions are as follows.
• To the best of the authors’ knowledge, for the first time,
a passive eavesdropping attack has been created which
completely cracks the JRNSO scheme.
• A secure loop-back key generation scheme referred to
as LB-TDD, is proposed for TDD systems. The scheme
can mitigate the hardware fingerprint interference and
consequently improve the channel reciprocity. It is
proved to be robust to both passive eavesdropping
and active MitM attack, analyzed from information
theoretical perspective and practical measurements.
• Extensive simulation is carried out and the LB-TDD
scheme is evaluated to outperform the classical TDD
scheme and JRNSO in terms of KDR and security level.
• A practical LB-TDD key generation system is devel-
oped using USRP N210 software defined radio (SDR)
platform. We demonstrate the advantages of CSI reci-
procity improvement of using LB-TDD scheme by real
experiments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the system model. Section 3 introduces the existing
JRNSO scheme and discusses the attack strategy. Section 4
presents the proposed LB-TDD scheme, and analyzes its
robustness to passive eavesdropping and active attack. In
Section 5, a key generation protocol is designed. Section 6
presents simulation results and analyses, and Section 7
validates the system with experimental studies. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 MB-PHY Model
A common setting with two legitimate users, i.e., Alice
and Bob, and an attacker, Eve, is considered in this paper.
3Fig. 1. System model with two frequency bands.
Fig. 1 illustrates the system model where Alice and Bob are
operating at two frequency bands (Band 1 and Band 2). In
the TDD systems with multi-carrier modulations, the multi-
band (MB)-PHY can be implemented by selecting different
subcarriers for each transmission. Eve knows the exact key
extraction protocol and the parameters used by legitimate
users.
CSI in the frequency domain between transmitter u and
receiver v is denoted as Huvi , where {u, v} = {A,B,E}
represent Alice, Bob or Eve, respectively, and i is the index
of the frequency band. The frequency responses of different
bands will be independent when they are out of the co-
herence bandwidth in a frequency-selective fading channel,
which is given as
H(t)uvi 6= H(t)uvj , ∀i 6= j. (1)
For the same link, the channel reciprocity holds and we have
H(t)uvi = H
(t)
vui . (2)
In this paper, we employed the OFDM system as an
example to obtain the CSI. OFDM has been adopted in many
commercial wireless systems, such as IEEE 802.11 a/g/n/ac,
LTE, etc.
2.2 CSI Non-Reciprocity
Channel reciprocity implies that the channel responses at
the two ends of the same link are reciprocal. However,
the real measurements are subject to hardware noise, non-
simultaneous measurements, and hardware imperfection.
While the former two factors have been studied in the previ-
ous work, e.g., [43], the effect of the hardware imperfection
has not been evaluated for the key generation systems [20],
[31], [32].
Due to the manufacture deviation, hardware fingerprints
exist even with the same manufacturer and production [44],
[45], [46], which will have oscillator differences and intro-
duce subcarrier frequency errors [45]. The frequency dif-
ference will result in phase shift, denoted as ϕuv . As the
frequency difference between two transceivers are mutually
inverse, ϕuv · ϕvu can equal 1. Moreover, there can be
amplifier non-linear behavior, transceiver filter character-
istics and gain imbalance features [44]. In this paper, we
consider hardware fingerprint only with transceiver filter
characteristics and gain imbalance features for simplicity.
Their influences are simplified as Gu.
The phase offset and hardware fingerprints will impact
the channel measurements. We use an equivalent channel
gain to represent the effect, which is given as
H˜(t)uvi = GuH
(t)
uviϕuv. (3)
This paper, for the first time, evaluated the effect of
hardware fingerprint and phase offset on key generation by
theoretical modelling, simulation and experiments.
3 JRNSO SCHEME FOR FDD SYSTEMS
In this section, the existing JRNSO loop-back scheme is
introduced. Then an attack strategy is presented and the se-
curity of JRNSO scheme is analyzed. Finally the deficiencies
of JRNSO scheme for FDD systems is discussed.
3.1 Description of JRNSO Scheme
The JRNSO scheme was designed to apply key generation
in FDD systems [37]. As the hardware fingerprint Gu is
not considered in their work, it is set to 1 in the following
analysis. In order to simplify the presentation, noise is not
considered either. The scheme is explained as below.
• Step(1): At time t, Alice generates a private frequency-
domain pilot P and transmits P to Bob via Band 1 and
Bob receives it as PHAB1 . As Bob has no information
about the private pilot P , he cannot estimate the chan-
nel.
• Step(2): Simultaneously at time t, Bob generates a pri-
vate pilot Q and transmits Q to Alice via Band 2
and Alice receives the signal as QHBA2 . As Alice has
no information about the private pilot Q, she cannot
estimate the channel.
• Step(3): At time t + τ , where τ is the delay between
two transmission, Bob transmits the signal received in
Step(1) via Band 2. Alice receives the loop-back signal
from Band 2 and obtains the signal: PHAB1HBA2 . As
Alice knows the private pilot P , she can estimate the
composite CSI: HAB1HBA2 .
• Step(4): Simultaneously at time t+τ , Alice transmits the
signal that received in Step(2) via Band 1. Bob receives
the loop-back signal from Band 1 and obtains signal:
QHBA2HAB1 . As Bob knows the private pilot Q, he
can obtain the composite CSI: HBA2HAB1 .
Through the above four steps, both Alice and Bob have the
same composite CSI: HBA2HAB1 , which can be exploited
for secret key generation.
3.2 Attack Strategy
In [37], the authors consider that Eve does not know the
private pilots P and Q, thus Eve cannot calculate the CSI
from PHAB1HBE2 and QHBA2HAE1 . Although Eve can
hardly obtain HAB1 and HBA2 , we still find an attack to
the JRNSO scheme by eavesdropping the above four steps.
The private pilot transmitted by Alice (Bob) in Step(1)
(Step(2)) can be also received by Eve as PHAE1 (QHBE2 ).
In addition, in Step(3) and Step(4), Eve can observe
PHAB1HBE2 and QHBA2HAE1 , respectively.
4Eve can divide the signal obtained in Step(3) by the
signal received in Step(2), which yields
PHAB1HBE2
QHBE2
=
P
QHAB1 . (4)
Then Eve divides the signal received in Step(4) by the signal
received in Step(1), which can be given as
QHBA2HAE1
PHAE1
=
Q
PHBA2 . (5)
Multiplying results in (4) and (5), Eve will get
P
QHAB1 ×
Q
PHBA2 = HAB1HBA2 , (6)
which is exactly the same information shared between Alice
and Bob. Therefore, the JRNSO protocol is vulnerable to
passive eavesdropping. A similar method can be adopted
to attack other JRNSO-like schemes such as that proposed
in [38].
The JRNSO scheme contains a “round-trip” signal trans-
mission. The receiver obtains the signal at one band, and
transmits the received signal back to the transmitter at
another band. All these transmissions can be captured by
Eve due to the open nature of the wireless medium and she
can crack the system by the mechanism proposed here.
4 LOOP-BACK SCHEME FOR TDD SYSTEMS
Although the JRNSO scheme has been proved to be vul-
nerable to passive eavesdropping in the FDD systems, we
have designed a new scheme by applying the loop-back
mechanism at two bands into TDD systems, termed LB-TDD
scheme. The new scheme can improve the reciprocity of the
measurements and is secure from the passive eavesdrop-
ping and active attacks.
4.1 LB-TDD Scheme
In the LB-TDD scheme, Alice and Bob use two bands for
transmission and reception, which is illustrated in Fig. 2 and
explained as follows.
• Step(1): At time t, Alice initially transmits the public
pilot signal to Bob via Band 1. Bob obtains the CSI as
H˜
(t)
AB1
= GAH
(t)
AB1
ϕAB + ω
(t)
B1
, (7)
where ωvi is the noise at receiver v at the i
th band.
• Step(2): At time t + τ , Bob transmits the pilot signal to
Alice via Band 1. Alice obtains the CSI as
H˜
(t+τ)
BA1
= GBH
(t+τ)
BA1
ϕBA + ω
(t+τ)
A1
. (8)
• Step(3): At time t+2τ , Bob transmits the signal received
in Step(1) using Band 2 and Alice can receive the loop-
back signal and obtains the CSI as
H˜
(t+2τ)
BA =GBH˜
(t)
AB1
H
(t+2τ)
BA2
ϕBA + ω
(t+2τ)
A2
=GBGAH
(t)
AB1
H
(t+2τ)
BA2
ϕABϕBA+
GBω
(t)
B1
H
(t+2τ)
BA2
ϕBA + ω
(t+2τ)
A2
. (9)
Fig. 2. Flowchart of LB-TDD scheme.
• Step(4): At time t + 3τ , Alice transmits the signal re-
ceived in Step(2) using Band 2. Bob receives the loop-
back signal and obtains the CSI as
H˜
(t+3τ)
AB =GAH˜
(t+τ)
BA1
H
(t+3τ)
AB2
ϕAB + ω
(t+3τ)
B2
=GAGBH
(t+τ)
BA1
H
(t+3τ)
AB2
ϕBAϕAB+
GAω
(t+τ)
B1
H
(t+3τ)
AB2
ϕAB + ω
(t+3τ)
B2
. (10)
A classical TDD-based key generation only consists of
Step(1) and Step(2). Our proposed LB-TDD scheme includes
Step(3) and Step(4), which are the loop-back processes. The
common randomness finally shared between Alice and Bob
isGAGBH
(t)
AB1
H
(t)
BA2
ϕBAϕAB , which includes the hardware
fingerprint and phase offset of the both users.
4.2 Theoretical Performance Analysis
In this section, we assume that the channel has perfect reci-
procity and unity gain for theoretical analysis. In addition,
receiver can perfectly eliminate phase offset ϕuv . The system
model can then be simplified as
H˜AB1 = GAHAB1 + ωB1 , (11)
H˜BA1 = GBHBA1 + ωA1 , (12)
H˜BA = GBHBA2H˜AB1 + ωA2 , (13)
H˜AB = GAHAB2H˜BA1 + ωB2 , (14)
where
E[Huv1H
H
uv1 ] = E[Huv2H
H
uv2 ] = r,
E[ωu1ωu1
H] = n,
E[ωu2ωu2
H] = n,
and E(·) is the expectation, the superscript (·)H is the
conjugate transpose of matrix, r is the received signal power,
and n is the noise power. We use a and b to denote the nor-
malized hardware fingerprint at Alice and Bob, respectively.
In the classical TDD key generation system, the normal-
ized mean square error (MSE) of the CSI measurement due
5to the hardware fingerprint interferences and noise can be
given as,
MSETDD =
E
{
|H˜AB1 − H˜BA1 |2
}
E
{
|H˜AB1 |2
}
=
(a− b)2r + 2n
a2r + n
. (15)
In our LB-TDD system, the normalized MSE of the CSI
measurement due to the hardware fingerprint interferences
and noise can be written as
MSELB-TDD =
E
{
|H˜AB − H˜BA|2
}
E
{
|H˜AB |2
}
=
a2rn+ b2rn+ 2n
a2b2r2 + b2rn+ n
. (16)
As shown in (15) and (16), the noise power is boosted
after loop-back transmission. When the difference between a
and b is small enough, the loop-back transmission will have
a higher MSE than the classical solution. The MSE difference
between the LB-TDD scheme and classical TDD scheme is
given by
MSE = MSETDD −MSELB-TDD
=
a2(a− b)2b2r3 + (−a4 + 2a2b2 − 2ab3 + b4)nr2
(a2r + n)(a2b2r2 + b2rn+ n)
+
(−2ab− a2(1 + n) + b2(1 + n))nr
(a2r + n)(a2b2r2 + b2rn+ n)
. (17)
The signal power r is fixed to unity and the noise power
n varies to achieve different SNR values. In order to inves-
tigate the influence of the hardware fingerprint difference,
i.e., d = |a− b|, we set the normalized hardware fingerprint
deviation of Alice a to 1, and vary that of Bob b.
A numerical calculation is carried out in order to investi-
gate the relationship between MSE deterioration and hard-
ware fingerprint difference. Fig. 3 shows the MSE difference
as the function of the SNR. The positive MSE values mean
that the LB-TDD scheme improves the MSE against the
mitigating hardware fingerprint effect. The negative values
indicate performance degradation because the noise boost in
loop-back transmission is more serious than the benefits. For
each hardware fingerprint deviation d, there is a SNR-MSE
trade-off point to determine whether we have MSE benefits
from loop-back transmission. Typically, for d = 0.02, 0.04,
0.06, 0.08 and 0.10, we can get MSE benefits when SNR is
higher than 18.0 dB, 15.7 dB, 13.9 dB, 12.6 dB and 11.8 dB,
respectively.
4.3 Passive Attack Strategy
Passive eavesdropping is one of the most common attacks
in the key generation area. Eavesdroppers can listen to
all the exchanging steps and try to crack the keys. This
section evaluates the security performance against passive
eavesdropping using both theoretical analysis and practical
measurements.
Fig. 3. MSE difference versus SNR.
4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis
The same attack strategies in JRNSO loop-back scheme does
not work for our LB-TDD scheme. In the first two steps,
Eve obtains the CSI HAE1 and HBE1 . In Step 3 and 4,
Eve can eavesdrop the communication and obtain the CSI
HAB1HBE2 and HBA1HAE2 , respectively. However, in the
LB-TDD scheme, due to the fact that transceivers transmit
the loop-back signals via a different frequency band, the
channel responses of eavesdroppers are not reciprocal, i.e.,
HAE1 6= HAE2 and HBE1 6= HBE2 .
We then analyze how much information is revealed to
eavesdroppers in key generation systems. A classical TDD
model is used to investigate the effect of information leakage
against the eavesdropping distance. For the simplification
of notation, in this section we use ĤA, ĤB , and ĤE to
denote the channel observation of Alice, Bob, and Eve,
respectively. Hardware fingerprint interference and phase
offset are not considered and the investigation can be treated
as a reference model.
The maximum number of unique information bits ex-
tracted between Alice and Bob is the mutual information
of the observed channels. Assuming correlated zero-mean
complex Gaussian random vectors for the channels [20], we
have
Ik = I
(
ĤA; ĤB
)
= log2
|R̂AA||R̂BB |
|R̂AB |
, (18)
where |x| is the determinant of x, and R̂x1x2 = E{Ĥx1ĤHx2}
is the covariance matrix.
As Bob and Eve are stationary, the secret key capacity
due to the eavesdropping [20] can be given as
Isk = I(ĤA; ĤB |ĤE) = log2
|R̂AE ||R̂BE |
|R̂EE ||R̂ABE |
. (19)
An upper band of the maximum number of unique
information bits is represented as [15]
C(A;B||E) ≤ min
[
Ik, Isk
]
. (20)
When Eve is closer to Bob, Isk gradually decreases due to
the increased correlation between ĤE and ĤB . Therefore,
the available safe key can be evaluated by means of a ratio
6Fig. 4. η versus eavesdropper distance.
of secret mutual information in (19) divided by mutual
information without eavesdropping in (18):
η = Isk/Ik. (21)
Theoretical work claims that key generation is secure
from passive eavesdropping when eavesdroppers are lo-
cated more than half wavelength away from the legitimate
users. We focus on eavesdroppers within one wavelength
of the legitimate parties. Without loss of generality, Eve is
assumed to be located close to Bob, i.e.,
|CB − CE | < 1, (22)
where Cu = [xu, yu] is the 2-D antenna coordinate of user
u in wavelength. Alice is in the far field of Bob and Eve.
Therefore, the transmission channel between Alice to Bob
and that between Alice to Eve can be treated as the same. As
the distance is very short between Bob and Eve, we use an
azimuth MIMO channel model [47] to simulate the multi-
path environment. The complex-valued baseband channel
impulse response [47] is given as
huv =
Npath∑
l=1
hl · exp
[
j(kl · Cu + k′l · Cv)
]
, (23)
where Npath is the number of the paths, kl =
2pi[cosφl, sinφl] and hl are the complex baseband gain of
lth path.
Following the model in (23), a complex Gaussian
Rayleigh channel is generated with Npath set to 128 and SNR
given as 20 dB. The relationship between η and eavesdrop-
per distance in wavelength is depicted in Fig. 4. When the
distance between Eve and Bob is less than 1/2 wavelength,
the secret mutual information Isk decreases dramatically. It
is clear that when Eve is close enough to Bob, i.e., within 1/4
wavelength, the key generation system can barely ensure
the security of the generated secret keys. When distance
between Eve and Bob is larger than 1/2 wavelength, the
revealed information is relatively small.
4.3.2 Practical Measurements
We also carried out practical measurements to reveal the
η = Isk/Ik in real environments. Existing work indicated
that RSS observed by eavesdropper located greater than
(a) 1λ (b) 0.75λ
(c) 0.5λ (d) 0.25λ
Fig. 5. CSI snapshots of Bob and Eve with different distances between
them.
half-wavelength away still has a strong correlation to that
of the legitimate users [48]. The inherent feature of multi-
path fading is the core factor that ensures the security of
key generation in the wireless channel. The OFDM system
can simultaneously measure CSI across a wide bandwidth
and is used to investigate the correlation of the CSI between
the eavesdropper and legitimate users.
We used a Rohde & Schwarz SMW200A vector signal
generator as the signal source for Alice; it was continuously
transmitting OFDM probing signals at a carrier frequency
of 2.485 GHz. Two receivers, Bob and Eve, were positioned
very close to each other within one wavelength, i.e. approx-
imately 12 cm for 2.485 GHz carrier frequency. Bob and
Eve simultaneously captured the OFDM probing signal, and
Isk and Ik were calculated from the measured results. The
phases of CSI are subject to synchronization offset, which
can hardly be completely eliminated in real measurements.
Therefore, only the amplitude results of CSI were used for
Isk and Ik calculation.
The measurements were carried out at four different
eavesdropping distances, including 1λ, 0.75λ, 0.5λ and
0.25λ. Snapshots of CSI with different distance configura-
tions are shown in Fig. 5 as examples and η = Isk/Ik calcu-
lated from measurements is depicted in Fig. 4. As expected,
the secret mutual information Isk gradually reduces when
Eve is closer to Bob. The measured results have a deviation
from the theoretical curve though, which is probably due to
the insufficient multi-path in the environment.
4.4 Active Attack Strategy
Thanks to the orthogonality among subcarriers in the
OFDM-based key generation, Eve cannot use the same
MitM attack introduced in [41]. Therefore, Eve has to im-
itate the OFDM probing symbols for active MitM attack. A
7(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 6. Possible active MitM attack procedures in LB-TDD scheme.
possible active attack strategy similar to [42] is considered in
this paper. We neglect the hardware fingerprint difference,
i.e. GA = GB = GE = 1, for this analysis.
In a classical TDD-based key generation system, Eve
listens to the transmissions and obtains CSIHAE1ϕAE when
Alice is sending OFDM probing symbols to Bob at Step(1)
of Fig. 2. At Step(2), Eve can inject OFDM probing symbols
with higher transmission power in order to initiate an
active attack. Alice thus obtains CSI HEA1ϕEA because the
jamming signal is much stronger than that from Bob. As
Alice has no prior information of ϕBA, she cannot find the
change of carrier frequency offset in HEA1ϕEA. When the
multi-path effect of the wireless channel is not significant,
HEA1 can be occasionally correlated to HBA1 , especially
when Eve is close to Bob. In this case, Eve has a good chance
to obtain the information of final secret key bits from the
eavesdropped CSI HAE1ϕAE .
Possible active MitM attacks in the LB-TDD scheme
are depicted in Fig. 6, with the transmissions and CSI
measurements obtained by Alice, Bob and Eve illustrated.
As shown in Fig. 6(a), Eve jams the transmission in both
Step(2) and Step(3). After the four steps, Alice, Bob and Eve
will obtain HAE1ϕAEHEA2ϕEA, HEA1ϕEAHAB2ϕAB and
HEA1ϕEAHAE2ϕAE , respectively. The CSI finally obtained
by Alice inherently has a zero subcarrier frequency offset
because ϕAE · ϕEA = 1. However, the final CSI obtained
by Bob will have a residual carrier frequency offset because
ϕEA · ϕAB 6= 1. Hence, Bob can quickly discover that the
communication has been actively attacked. Furthermore,
Bob can also easily detect an active attack if Eve only attacks
in Step(2), as shown in Fig. 6(b).
In order to reduce the risk of being detected, Eve can
CSI 
Estimation
Feature 
Extraction
Quantization
Information
Reconciliation
Privacy
Amplification
Power
 Normalization
Noise
 Reduction
Down-
Sampling
Logarithmic
 Process
Fig. 7. Proposed secret key generation protocol.
only inject a jamming signal in Step(3), as shown in Fig. 6(c).
In this case, both Alice and Bob can obtain a CSI without a
carrier frequency offset. However, the CSI obtained by Eve
is HBA1ϕBAHAE2ϕAE . Since ϕBA ·ϕAE 6= 1 and there is no
pilot symbol for frequency offset estimation, Eve will have
to carry out blind frequency offset estimation which is very
complex when the number of subcarrier is large.
The frequency offset at the receiver causes significant
inter-carrier interference in OFDM systems [45], [49]. In
order to compensate the frequency offset, pilots are carefully
designed and an advanced frequency offset estimation algo-
rithm is implemented at the receiver. In the LB-TDD scheme,
thanks to the loop-back transmission, the residual carrier
frequency offset is normally eliminated at both Alice and
Bob. However, Eve cannot accurately estimate the carrier
frequency offset so there will be residual ϕEAϕAB .
In summary, thanks to the loop-back transmission, legit-
imate users can quickly detect the active attack due to the
abnormal change of the carrier frequency offset. Moreover,
the LB-TDD scheme can inherently overcome the carrier
frequency offset without additional training sequence. This
advantage further enhances the security of CSI exchanging
process between Alice and Bob.
5 LB-TDD KEY GENERATION SCHEME
In this section, we designed the protocol of LB-TDD scheme,
which is consisted of five steps: CSI estimation, feature
extraction, quantization, information reconciliation, and pri-
vacy amplification, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
5.1 CSI Estimation
Let’s take one loop as an example to explain the channel es-
timation. The user u will first transmit public pilot symbols
S to user v via Band 1, which can be given as
Yv(m) = GuHuv1(m)S(m)ϕuv + ωv1(m), (24)
where m is the subcarrier index. User v will then loop the
received signal back to user u via Band 2, which can be
written as
Yu(m) = GvHvu2(m)Yv(m)ϕvu + ωu2(m). (25)
Finally, user u can obtain the CSI through least square (LS)
estimation [50]
H˜uv(m) =
Yu(m)
S(m)
. (26)
85.2 Feature Extraction
We designed a feature extraction method to improve the
quality of the channel estimation, which is shown in Fig. 7
and includes power normalization, noise reduction, down-
sampling, and logarithmic process.
In practical mobile communications systems, the user
received power may differ. The power of the channel es-
timation is firstly normalized as follows,
H˜
Norm
uv (m) =
H˜uv(m)√∑N
i=1 |H˜uv(i)|2
. (27)
In addition, the received loop-back signal contains noise
factors, ωv1 , and, ωv2 , in both transmissions, which affect
the estimation accuracy. We adopted a moving average
filter leveraging the correlation of channel response among
adjacent subcarriers [51] to mitigate noise effect and smooth
normalized CSI, which is given as
H¯
Norm
uv (m) =
∑m+L2
i=m−L2 +1
H˜
Norm
uv (i)
L
, (28)
where L is the size of the moving window. Moreover, since
the channel responses of subcarriers within the coherence
bandwidth are correlated, we can downsample the channel
responses with a sampling factor D. This is written as:
H¯
Down
uv (m) = H¯
Norm
uv
(
(m− 1)D + 1). (29)
Finally, in order to increase the dynamic range of the ampli-
tude for quantization, we transform H¯
Down
uv from linear scale
to logarithmic scale by
H
Log
uv (m) = 10 log10H¯
Down
uv (m). (30)
5.3 Quantization
Quantization schemes convert analogue values into binary
sequence by comparing with reference thresholds, qi. For
instance, the order-1 quantization with a gap, qg , is repre-
sented as
km =

1 H
Log
uv (m) ≥ q1 + qg
dropped q1 − qg < HLoguv (m) < q1 + qg
0 H
Log
uv (m) ≤ q1 − qg
, (31)
where q1 is the threshold for order-1 quantization; km is
quantified binary. When high-order quantization is adopted,
multiple thresholds [q1, q2, · · · ] can be designed based on
the dynamic range of H
Log
uv (m). A higher quantization order
will increase the secret key generation rate but will result
in serious key disagreement. Quantization orders and gaps
should be carefully selected to balance the secret key gener-
ation rate and key disagreement.
5.4 Information Reconciliation
After the quantization process, Alice and Bob will exchange
the information of their discarded channel measurements.
They will use a mapping table to maintain the same channel
measurements.
TABLE 1
Channel model
Channel
Multi-path delay
(ms)
Averaged power
of each path (dB)
Alice to Bob [0 0.31 0.71 1.09 1.73 2.51] [0 -1 -9 -10 -15 -20]
Alice to Eve [0 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.29 0.31] [0 -3 -10 -18 -26 -32]
Bob to Eve [0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7]
[0 -3.6 -7.2 -10.8 -18
-25.2]
Alice HF [0 0.065 0.13 0.185] [0 -5 -7 -10]
Bob HF [0 0.065 0.13] [0 -4 -10]
TABLE 2
Simulation parameter
Parameters Values
OFDM symbol length (with CP) 128 us
Subcarrier frequency spacing 15 KHz
Bandwidth 10 MHz
FFT size 1024
Carrier frequency at band 1 1.8 GHz
Carrier frequency at band 2 2.0 GHz
Span for moving average filter (L) 30
Downsample factor (D) 8
TABLE 3
Quantization threshold
Quantization Order Threshold qi
Order-1 (- 2)
Order-2 (-4, -2, 0)
Order-3 (-8, -6, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4)
5.5 Privacy Amplification
After information reconciliation, privacy amplification is
employed to remove the revealed information from the
generated key bits. Similar to [52] and [53], a cryptographic
hash function is employed for privacy amplification.
6 SIMULATION WITH LTE MODEL
In this section, we analyze the performance of the proposed
LB-TDD scheme and compare it with the classical TDD and
JRNSO schemes with extensive simulation.
6.1 Simulation Parameters
Table 1 lists simulation parameters including path delay and
the average power of each path of Alice, Bob and Eve. These
parameters are recommended by the ITU Vehicular Type A
channel model [54]. The effect of hardware fingerprint is
modeled as a filter with different taps in the time domain,
and the filter parameters are also shown in Table 1. We used
an LTE transceiver model [55] and the simulation parame-
ters are given in Table 2. Finally, quantization thresholds are
shown in Table 3.
We used two metrics, namely key disagreement rate
(KDR) and key generation rate (KGR), to evaluate the sys-
tem performance. The KDR is defined as the total disagree
key bits between two users divided by the total generated
9(a) KDR (b) KGR
Fig. 8. KDR and KGR performance of LB-TDD scheme versus SNR with
different quantization gaps (order-2 quantization and 5 km/h).
(a) KDR (b) KGR
Fig. 9. KDR and KGR performance of LB-TDD scheme versus moving
speed with different quantization orders (quantization gap of 0.2 and
SNR of 30 dB).
key bits. In order to reveal the CSI reciprocity between
different schemes, KDR was calculated before information
reconciliation. The KGR is defined as the total generated
key bit divided by the number of total used subcarriers.
6.2 Performance of the LB-TDD Scheme
Fig. 8 shows the performance of KDR and KGR under dif-
ferent SNRs and quantization gaps, with an example setup
of order-2 quantization and 5 km/h moving speed. With the
targeted KDR of 1× 10−3, the required SNR is about 29 dB,
25 dB, 22 dB and 18 dB, for quantization gaps of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6
and 0.8, respectively. The obtained KGR is around 1.7, 1.4,
1.1 and 0.8 for each quantization gap with the desired SNR.
KGR is reduced when the quantization gap is increased
because more samples are dropped. On the other hand,
increasing the quantization gap will significantly reduce the
KDR. Therefore, the quantization gap needs to be optimized
according to practical system settings.
Fig. 9 presents the KDR and KGR performance with
respect to different quantization orders and moving speeds,
with a quantization gap of 0.2 and SNR of 30 dB. Quanti-
zation order needs to be carefully selected, because it has
opposite effects on the KDR and KGR. In addition, increas-
ing the moving speed will cause more severe KDR. Fig. 10
shows the snapshots of the measured CSI between Alice
and Bob under slow mobility (5 km/h) and high mobility
(120 km/h). In high mobility scenario, the CSI measure-
ments of the two channel links have obvious disagreement,
which increases the KDR between Alice and Bob.
(a) 5 km/h (b) 120 km/h
Fig. 10. CSI snapshot of Alice and Bob in LB-TDD scheme.
(a) 5 km/h moving speed (b) 60 km/h moving speed
Fig. 11. KDR performance of different schemes.
6.3 Comparisons of Different Schemes
We compare the performance of TDD, JRNSO and LB-TDD
schemes in this section. Simulation parameters were con-
figured as follows, an order-2 quantization, a quantization
gap of 0.2, and two mobilities of 5 km/h and 60 km/h. We
also simulated the eavesdropping process for the JRNSO
scheme. Eve can obtain a CSI between Alice and Eve and
also between Bob and Eve with a very high SNR (40 dB).
Eve tries to crack the mutual CSI between Alice and Bob
using the attack strategy discussed in Section 3.2.
Fig. 11 shows the comparison results. Alice and Bob
obtain similar KDR performance when using the JRNSO
and LB-TDD schemes. Both schemes outperforms the TDD
scheme when the SNR is higher than 10 dB. However, in
the JRNSO scheme, the KDR of Alice-Bob and KDR of
Alice-Eve are very close, which means Eve can get a very
similar observation and crack the mutual CSI between Alice
and Bob. A snapshot of CSI obtained by Alice and Eve is
presented in Fig. 12(a) as an example, where Eve obtains
almost identical CSI as Alice. As a result, the JRNSO scheme
cannot ensure the security of generated key bits. Fig. 12(b)
presents a snapshot of CSI obtained by Alice and Bob in
the classical TDD scheme. Due to the hardware fingerprint
interference, the measured CSI has a significant difference.
Hence, the LB-TDD scheme achieves better CSI reciprocity
compared to the classical TDD scheme.
7 PRACTICAL EVALUATION USING USRP
A hardware testbed using USRP SDR platform was built
to evaluate the performance of proposed scheme in a real
environment.
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(a) CSI obtained in JRNSO (b) CSI obtained in TDD
Fig. 12. CSI snapshots in the JRNSO and classical TDD schemes.
Fig. 13. Experimental setup.
7.1 Measurement Setup
Two USRP N210 SDR platforms [56] were used as Alice and
Bob, embedded with the CBX daughterboards with a carrier
frequency range from 1.2 GHz to 6 GHz and a maximal
bandwidth of 40 MHz. The experiments were carried out
at the 2.4 GHz Industrial Scientific Medical (ISM) band. In
LB-TDD schemes, we selected the Wi-Fi 2.4 GHz channel 1
(2.412 GHz) for Band 1 and channel 5 (2.432 GHz) for Band
2. Bandpass filters (Mini-Circuits, ZFBP-2400-s+, 2.3 GHz-
2.5 GHz) were connected after the antennae in order to filter
out-band interference.
The OFDM probing signal was generated in MATLAB
and stored as a data stream file in the PC. We implemented
the TDD and LB-TDD schemes using GNURadio software.
The USRP receiver received the signal, which was trans-
ferred to the PC and processed by MATLAB. Our experi-
mental setup is illustrated in Fig. 13, and key parameters of
experimental setups are listed in Table 4.
We carried out extensive experiments in the laboratories
at Southeast University, China under two scenarios, i.e.,
line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS). In LOS
scenario, two USRP devices were placed in one room and
close to each other. In NLOS scenario, two USRP devices
were placed in two separated rooms with a distance of about
5 meters.
TABLE 4
Parameters for practical implementations
Parameters Values
OFDM symbol length (with CP) 3.2 us
Subcarrier frequency spacing 390.625 KHz
Bandwidth 25 MHz
FFT size 64
Carrier frequency at band 1 2.412 GHz
Carrier frequency at band 2 2.432 GHz
Span for moving average filter (L) 30
Downsample factor (D) 2
Quantization threshold (-4, -2, 0)
Quantization gap (qg) 0.2
(a) TDD (b) LB-TDD
Fig. 14. CSI snapshots of Alice and Bob in the TDD and LB-TDD
schemes in LOS scenarios.
(a) TDD (b) LB-TDD
Fig. 15. CSI snapshots of Alice and Bob in the TDD and LB-TDD
schemes in NLOS scenario.
7.2 Experimental Results
7.2.1 Performance Analysis
As shown in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15, there are slight differences
between the Alice’s and Bob’s CSI in both schemes, which
will cause a key disagreement after quantization. It can be
observed that the CSI mismatch in the LB-LDD scheme is
reduced with the help of loop-back transmission.
Fig. 16 shows the KDR and KGR performance in LOS
and NLOS scenarios. The LB-TDD scheme outperforms the
classical TDD scheme in terms of both KDR and KGR. For
the LB-TDD scheme, the averaged KDR is about 3.9× 10−3
in the LOS and 7.9×10−3 in the NLOS scenarios. Moreover,
both LB-TDD and TDD systems achieve better KDR perfor-
mance but a little worse KGR in the LOS scenario compared
to those in the NLOS scenario. This is mainly because Alice
and Bob can obtain better reciprocal CSI in the LOS scenario,
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(a) KDR (b) KGR
Fig. 16. KDR and KGR performance of LB-TDD and TDD schemes in
real experiments.
but the multi-path effects are not as significant as those in
the NLOS scenario.
7.2.2 Randomness Test and Discussion
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
random test suite [57] is widely adopted to evaluate the
randomness of true-random and pseudo-random number
generators. When the P-value test result is greater than
the threshold usually chosen as 0.01, the sequence passes
the test. Key generation is intrinsically a random number
generator, so we also used the NIST test suite to evaluate
the randomness of our generated key sequences.
Privacy amplification usually employs hash function.
The output of the hash function is random/pseudo-random
most of of the time. However, when the input is not random,
it is subject to the dictionary attack and the attacker is
likely to obtain the low-entropy key. Therefore, in this paper,
we evaluate the randomness of the key sequence before
carrying out the privacy amplification.
We evaluated the key randomness for systems with
different downsample factors D for both our experimental
and simulation data, which are shown in Table 5 and Table 6,
respectively. The cells highlighted in light gray indicate a
failure of the test. Since we are quantizing keys from the
frequency domain, there is correlation between any two
subcarriers within the coherence bandwidth. As shown in
the tables, when the downsample factor D = 16 and
D = 128, the key sequence generated from experimental
and simulation data pass the NIST randomness tests, re-
spectively, which indicates little correlation between these
selected subcarriers. The downsample factors are different
in the above two scenarios, because the channel conditions,
namely, mulitpath levels, are different, which lead to differ-
ent coherence bandwidth.
A larger downsample factor will select subcarriers with
less correlation, which is beneficial for the randomness
feature. On the other hand, large downsample factor will
directly reduce the number of generated key bits because
less subcarriers are kept for key extraction. An appropriate
downsample factor, D, should be designed very carefully
according to the channel condition in order to achieve a
random yet fast key generation system.
8 CONCLUSIONS
A novel loop-back LB-TDD scheme has been proposed to
enhance the channel reciprocity in secret key generation. We
TABLE 5
NIST results of the experimental data with different downsample
factor D
Test D =2 D =4 D =8 D =16
Approx. Entropy 0 0.0066 0.0344 0.0832
Block Freq. 0 0.0132 0.0516 0.1359
Cum. Sums 0.0746 0.1083 0.0196 0.3241
DFT 0.0335 0.4851 0.0991 0.5536
Frequency 0.1470 0.0134 0.0923 0.0285
Longest Run of 1 0 0 0.0014 0.0854
Ranking 0.2919 0.2919 0.0249 0.2919
Runs 0 0.0480 0.0413 0.6185
Serial
0 0.0088 0.0416 0.0892
0 0.0670 0.0604 0.8551
TABLE 6
NIST results of the simulation data with different downsample factor D
Test D = 32 D = 64 D = 128 D = 256
Approx. Entropy 0 0.0116 0.0702 0.0987
Block Freq. 0.3842 0.1950 0.0983 0.6073
Cum. Sums 0.5219 0.4551 0.9112 0.8926
DFT 0.1468 0.0369 0.1317 0.4981
Frequency 0.0968 0.0905 0.0213 0.0320
Longest Run of 1 0 0 0.4160 0.1839
Ranking 0.0852 0.2919 0.2714 0.0391
Runs 0 0.0140 0.9778 0.7923
Serial
0 0.0144 0.0685 0.0997
0 0.0178 0.8117 0.9101
presented a new MB-PHY model with practical considera-
tion of hardware fingerprint interference. An existing FDD
loop-back scheme, namely JRNSO, was studied and a seri-
ous security risk was identified which did not apply to our
proposed LB-TDD scheme. Through an extensive evaluation
against passive eavesdropping and active MitM attack, the
LB-TDD scheme was shown to be very secure and robust. In
order to evaluate the performance of the proposed LB-TDD
scheme, we prototyped our LB-TDD system, the classical
TDD system and the JRNSO with an LTE model and un-
dertook an extensive simulation and comparison. The LB-
TDD system was shown to have a better performance in
terms of security and channel reciprocity. Finally, we built a
hardware evaluation system using the USRP SDR platform
and verified our theoretical analyses using experimental
results. Future work will focus on optimizations of the secret
key generation method using CSI measurement in OFDM
systems.
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